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Abstract
Mobile devices are constantly connected to the Internet, making countless connections with remote services.
Unfortunately, many of these connections are in cleartext, visible to third-parties while in transit. This is insecure
and opens up the possibility for man-in-the-middle attacks. While there is little control over what kind of connection
running apps can make, this paper presents a solution in blocking insecure HTTP packets from leaving the device.
Specifically, the proposed solution works on the device, without the need to tunnel packets to a remote VPN server,
and without special privileges such as root access. Speed tests were performed to quantify how much network speed
is being impacted while filtering. To investigate how blocking HTTP traffic can affect day-to-day usage, common
tasks were put to the tests, tasks such as browsing, searching, emailing, instant messaging, social networking,
consuming streaming content, and gaming. The results from the tests are interesting, websites that do not support
HTTPS were exposed, apps that do not fully support HTTPS were also being uncovered. One surprisingly, and
arguably pleasant, side effect was discovered – the filtering solution blocks out advertisements in all of the games
being tested, hence contributing to an improved gaming experience.

Keywords
Filtering, blocking, on-device, security, virtual network interface, mobile device, Android

INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices commonly connect to untrusted wireless access points, this is especially so while travelling.
Connection to untrusted network presents a risk for man-in-the-middle attacks, making eavesdropping, content
injection, and cookie stealing possible (Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d.). However, man-in-the-middle attacks
are possible only when the connection is not encrypted end to end, such as that provided by HTTP protocol. By
denying HTTP requests, the risk of exposing the device to man-in-the-middle attacks will effectively be reduced.
Applying a blanket denial of all HTTP requests might not be as outrageous as it sounds. Internet giants and security
experts have been advocating web security for a number of years now (“Encrypt All the Things”, n.d.; Google
Developers, 2014; Schechter, 2016; Vyas & Dolanjski, 2017; Wagenseil, 2014). Leading browsers are starting to
name and shame HTTP websites (Claburn, 2018; Rutherford, 2017; Schechter, 2018), and devising plans to
deprecate non-secure HTTP (Barnes, 2015). Android and iOS are introducing plans to drop insecure connections
(Conger, 2016; Thierer, 2017). Google is even ranking HTTPS sites higher than their HTTP counterparts (Bahajji
& Illyes, 2014).
This paper looks at an on-device filtering solution to block out insecure HTTP requests only. The proposed solution
being investigated will be confined to the Android operating system, and will not require the device to be rooted.

EXISTING VPN SOLUTIONS AND THEIR DRAWBACKS
VPN, or Virtual Private Network, is a common solution used to combat against man-in-the-middle attacks. VPN
establishes an encrypted tunnel between the device and the VPN server, even though the untrusted network still
sits in between, a man-in-the-middle attack is not possible since all traffic is now protected by encryption as it
goes through the tunnel (Siciliano, 2017), as shown in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: Secure encrypted tunnels established between devices and VPN server
There are however a number of drawbacks with VPN:
1.

Requirement for VPN server – This adds an additional dependency on an external service. Additional
dependency introduces another point of failure into the system.

2.

Costs involved – There is VPN server setup, running, and maintenance costs involved. For those who
choose to use third-party service, there is service fee involved. Affordability can be a barrier for some.

3.

Setup is required on mobile devices – Depending on the type of VPN, the setup might not be trivial, and
this could potentially put users off.

4.

VPN service not guaranteed to be available at all times – With any other services, no VPN providers can
guarantee an uptime of 100%. During the times when the VPN service is down, encryption will also be
unavailable.

5.

Network speed is affected – Since every network packet gets routed through the VPN server, network
speed will be degraded if the VPN server, or required connections, are not performant.

6.

Third-party VPN service cannot fully be trusted – There is the risk that man-in-the-middle attacks can be
carried out by the VPN provider, or by attackers if in the event that the VPN server is compromised. The
risk is not mitigated under such a scenario, it is simply shifted from the local network operator to the VPN
provider.

7.

VPN traffic can be blocked – VPN traffic is known to be blocked by some firewalls which are typically
outside of user’s control. It is also known to be blocked in certain countries such as China (“VPN
blocking”, 2018).

8.

Traffic not encrypted end-to-end – The encrypted tunnel only extends from the device to the VPN server.
Once traffic leaves the VPN server, unencrypted HTTP traffic will no longer be protected.

A related study investigating privacy leaks from mobile devices took a similar approach, the mobile device
connects to the Internet via a VPN proxy sitting in between, where packets are being inspected (Jingjing, Ashwin,
Martina, Arnaud, & David, 2016). Since this approach has a reliance on an external VPN proxy, it suffers from
the same drawbacks as discussed above.

ON-DEVICE FILTERING SOLUTION
This paper presents a filtering solution which does not rely on an external VPN service, it is an on-device solution
and does not require the Android device to be rooted. Note that because of the non-rooted requirement, running a
local VPN server on the device is ruled out since raw sockets are only available with root privilege.
Fortunately, Android SDK provides a virtual network interface to app developers where all traffic gets routed
through. The interface, which operates at the IP layer, provides the app with a file descriptor. Each read from the
descriptor retrieves an outbound IP packet, and each write to the description injects an inbound IP packet.
This ability given to regular apps to intercept network traffic without root access is via the API class VpnService
(“Android SDK VpnService”, n.d.). A number of studies conducted previously which required on-device packet
interception and inspection also used VpnService in their research (Ikram & Kaafar, 2017; Ozsoy, 2016; Shuba,
2016; Song & Hengartner, 2015; Trivedi & Das, 2017).
The approach here is to let the filter app examine every outgoing packet. If an outgoing packet is an insecure HTTP
packet, the filter app will block it by not letting it go any further, otherwise, the filter app will make necessary
connections with the packet’s target server and route it to its rightful destination. On the reverse side, when the
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filter app gets incoming traffic from these opened connections, it needs to route the traffic back into the virtual
network interface.
How HTTP Traffic is Blocked
As illustrated in Figure 2, this is how HTTP traffic initiated from an app within the device is blocked by the filter
app from ever leaving the device:
1.

An app initiates an HTTP connection with a remote host at example.com.

2.

Android routes HTTP packet to the virtual network interface provided by VpnService.

3.

Filter app gets the packet from the virtual network interface.

4.

Filter app examines the packet.

5.

Since it is an HTTP packet, filter app does nothing further with it, essentially blocking it from leaving the
device.

Figure 2: How HTTP Traffic is Blocked by the Filter App
How HTTPS Traffic is Allowed
The following Figure 3 illustrates how HTTPS traffic is not blocked:
1.

An app initiates an HTTPS connection with a remote host at example.com.

2.

Android routes HTTPS packet to the virtual network interface provided by VpnService.

3.

Filter app gets the packet from the virtual network interface.

4.

Filter app examines the packet.

5.

Since it is not an HTTP packet, filter app establishes a connection with the remote host.

6.

Once the connection is established, filter app routes the traffic to the remote host.

7.

Filter app gets incoming traffic from the remote host via the connection.

8.

Filter app routes incoming packets into the virtual network interface.

9.

Android routes incoming packets to the app that initiated the HTTPS connection.
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Figure 3: How HTTPS Traffic is Allowed by the Filter App
Implementation of the Filtering Solution
There is an open source Android app called NetGuard, which uses VpnService to filter traffic by IP address
(Bokhorst, 2018). NetGuard, however, does not do exactly what is needed in this research. Since its source code
is open, required modifications can be made to block all HTTP traffic.
One change was made in the source code for this study, it is found on line 301 in app/src/main/jni/nethuard/ip.c
file, as shown in Figure 4. This line of change simply instructs the app to block the outbound IP packet if it is a
TCP packet and its remote port is 80, which is the standard port for HTTP protocol. The source code is available
at GitHub source code repository (Chong, 2018).
Note that the change introduced in ip.c file will unfortunately not block HTTP traffic connecting to other ports.
Additionally, although very unlikely, this can incorrectly block non-HTTP traffic connecting to remote port 80.
For the scope of this research, it is reasonable to assume that all HTTP traffic, and no other traffic, is connecting
to remote port 80 from the device.

Figure 4: Change made to NetGuard source code in app/src/main/jni/nethuard/ip.c
Once the required change is made, the modified NetGuard can be built using Android Studio or the command line
tools (“Android Studio”, n.d.). Besides the minimum requirement of Android version 5.1, NetGuard is just a
regular app with no special prerequisites. One setting needs to be configured within the app for it to filter HTTP
traffic – which is to turn on the ‘Filter traffic’ switch on the ‘Advanced options’ screen as shown in Figure 5. The
‘Advanced options’ screen is accessed via three-dot menu (top right on NetGuard’s main screen) > Settings >
Advanced options.
To start filtering, the switch at the top left on NetGuard’s main screen needs to be turned on, as shown in Figure
6. Once filtering is switched on, visiting an HTTP website is no longer possible (Figure 7) but visiting an HTTPS
website is unaffected (Figure 8).
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Figure 5: NetGuard
configured to run
in filter mode

Figure 6: Turning on
filtering (orange switch
at the top of NetGuard’s
main screen). The icon
which looks like a key on
the system status bar
indicates that filtering is
turned on for the device.

Figure 7: Insecure HTTP
traffic is blocked

Figure 8: Secure HTTPS
traffic is allowed

SPEED TESTS
Since each IP packet is being intercepted by NetGuard for examination, this can slow down the traffic flow. To
measure how much the download speed is affected, some tests were conducted on the device using an app called
Speedtest by Ookla (“Speedtest by Ookla”, n.d.). The result of the tests is being plotted in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Download speeds in Mbps
The tests show that there is hardly any decrease in the download speed while the traffic is being filtered by
NetGuard. Apart from Test 5, the download speed for when NetGuard is filtering is almost identical to the
download speed for when NetGuard is not filtering, on average, it is just 5.47% slower. With this result, it is
reasonable to conclude that the proposed filtering solution does not negatively impact the network speed of the
device.
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DAY-TO-DAY MOBILE USAGE TESTS
In the next set of tests, we want to find out if day-to-day mobile device usage is being affected by this filtering
solution, and if so, how is it being impacted. Besides the telephony functions, such as making calls and texting via
SMSs, a list of tasks commonly performed by mobile users in recent times (“REVEALED: Top uses of our
smartphones - and calling doesn't even make the list”, 2017; “The most common usage of a mobile phone”, 2015)
are being compiled and put under tests, these tasks are:
1.

Browsing

2.

Emailing

3.

Searching

4.

Social networking

5.

Instant messaging

6.

Watching and listening to streaming contents

7.

Gaming

8.

Reading news and checking weather

9.

Navigation

10. Banking
11. Taking pictures
12. Using other common apps
Browsing
The goal of this test is to assess how blocking can affect the browsing experience. To do this, top 10 sites in
Australia according to Alexa (“Top Sites in Australia”, 2018) were put to the test. Chrome browser app was used
for this test, note that ‘https://’ had to be explicitly entered into the URL, otherwise the browser would default to
HTTP protocol. Results of this test are tabulated below in Table 1.
Table 1: Results of Visiting Top 10 Sites in Australian Using HTTPS
Raking

Website

Result

Notes

1

https://google.com.au

Passed

Works flawlessly.

2

https://youtube.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

3

https://google.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

4

https://facebook.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

5

https://reddit.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

6

https://wikipedia.org

Passed

Works flawlessly.

7

https://ebay.com.au
https://www.ebay.com.au

Failed
Passed

https://ebay.com.au redirects to
http://ebay.com.au

8

https://live.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

9

https://twitter.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

10

https://netflix.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

All the above sites could be visited using HTTPS. One interesting note regarding eBay’s website, it failed for
https://ebay.com.au but if the user typed in https://www.ebay.com.au instead, it would work fine. The concluding
remark from this test is that visiting popular sites are not being impacted by the filtering solution, the one minor
inconvenience is that this mandates the user to type ‘https://’ at the beginning of the website address, otherwise
the browser would assume using HTTP protocol.
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Emailing
The three most popular email apps were put to the test. Results of this test are tabulated below in Table 2.
Table 2: Results of Using Popular Email Apps
App

Result

Notes

Gmail

Passed

Works flawlessly, including notifications on new email.

Microsoft Outlook

Passed

Works flawlessly, including notifications on new email.

Yahoo Mail

Passed

Works flawlessly, including notifications on new email.

All three apps work flawlessly in this test. No issues found with both sending and receiving emails, with or without
attachments. Notifications also work as usual whenever a new email arrives.
Searching
The three most used search engines are Google, Bing, and Yahoo. These search engines were visited using the
Chrome browser app, the results are tabulated in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Results of Using Popular Search Engines
Search Engine

URL

Result

Notes

Google

https://google.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Bing

https://bing.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Yahoo

https://yahoo.com

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Performing searching using the above search engines work flawlessly, search results are returned as per normal.
However, if a result’s link is using HTTP protocol, clicking on that link will fail as expected. In such a case, the
user will have to manually change ‘http://’ to ‘https://’ with the hope that the site has support for HTTPS.
Google and Bing have their own app, they were also put under test, with the results tabled below in Table 4.
Table 4: Results of Using Search Engine Apps
App

Result

Notes

Google

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Bing

Passed

Works flawlessly.

The experience of using these apps is similar to using the browser, search results were returned as per normal. As
with using the browser, if a result’s link is in HTTP protocol, clicking on that link will fail to load.
Social Networking
Some of the most popular social network apps were put to the test next, the results are shown in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Results of Using Popular Social Network Apps
App

Result

Notes

Facebook

Passed

Works flawlessly, including notifications.

Twitter

Passed

Works flawlessly, including notifications.

Instagram

Passed

Works flawlessly, including notifications.

LinkedIn

Passed

Works flawlessly, including notifications.

There are no issues using all these apps, they function normally in every aspect. Notifications also work fine. As
expected, any outbound links in HTTP would be blocked by the filtering solution, and hence would fail to load.
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Instant Messaging
Next, instant messaging apps were being tested, voice and video calling capabilities were also tested. The results
are documented in Table 6.
Table 6: Results of Using Popular Instant Messaging Apps
App

Result

Notes

Messenger

Passed

Works flawlessly. Receiving and sending text messages and photos work
well, receiving and making voice and video calls also work well. All
notifications are being received.

Hangouts

Passed

Works flawlessly. Receiving and sending text messages and photos work
well, receiving and making voice and video calls also work well. All
notifications are being received.

WhatsApp

Passed

Works flawlessly. Receiving and sending text messages and photos work
well, receiving and making voice and video calls also work well. All
notifications are being received.

There are no issues here, all of the above apps work flawlessly in every way.
Media Streaming
In this test, video and audio streaming apps were being investigated, the results are tabulated in Table 7 below.
Table 7: Results of Using Popular Media Streaming Apps
App

Result

Notes

YouTube

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Vimeo

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Spotify

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Google Play Music

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Netflix

Passed

Works flawlessly.

ABC iview

Failed

Textual and graphics contents are showing fine on the app, but
none of the video contents can be played.

SBS On Demand

Failed

Textual and graphics contents are showing fine on the app, but
none of the video contents can be played.

Besides ABC iview and SBS On Demand apps, no issues were found while using all the other apps. All contents,
be it textual or graphical, video or audio, all work flawlessly. ABC iview and SBS On Demand apps appear to be
working fine initially since all textual and graphics contents are displaying correctly, but none of the videos can
be played.
Gaming
In this test, some of the top games listed on Google Play Store were put to the test. The results are tabulated below
in Table 8.
Table 8: Results of Playing Games
App

Result

Notes

Helix Jump

Passed

Game itself is not affected. Advertisements which normally appear at the
bottom of the screen are no longer being shown. Intermittent
advertisement screens are also no longer being shown between levels.

Flip the Gun

Passed

Game itself is not affected. Intermittent advertisement screens appear with
no content on it because the content is being blocked, this can cause
confusion since it appears that the app is non-responsive.
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Love Balls

Passed

Game itself is not affected. Intermittent video advertisements are blocked
and therefore no longer being shown, giving users uninterrupted flow
between levels. However, users can no longer ask for hints since this
feature requires the app to first show a video advertisement before
showing the hint.

Donuts Drift

Passed

Game itself is not affected. Advertisements which normally appear at the
bottom of the screen are no longer being shown. Intermittent
advertisement screens are also no longer being shown between games.

Granny

Passed

Game itself is not affected. Intermittent video advertisements are blocked
and therefore no longer being shown, giving users uninterrupted plays.

An interesting observation came out of this test – all advertisement contents, be it video or graphic, were delivered
via HTTP and hence blocked. The original purpose of this study’s filtering proposal was to address security issue
by blocking insecure HTTP traffic, this test has shown that it has inadvertently introduced a beneficial side effect
– advertisements are now blocked, giving gamers uninterrupted plays for most of the games. Flip the Gun was the
only game which was still popping up the advertisement screen, but with empty content.
This finding is in line with what Kaspersky researchers have discovered recently (Osborne, 2018), where a number
of popular apps were found to be using insecure advertising Software Development Kits (SDKs). These SDKs,
which use HTTP protocol for delivering contents as well as collecting user data, are often offered free to
developers.
Reading News and Checking Weather
Next, some of the top Australian news (Nielsen, 2018) and weather websites were put to the test. Chrome browser
app was once again used for conducting this test. Results are documented in Table 9 below.
Table 9: Results of Visiting Top Australian News and Weather Websites Using HTTPS
Website

URL

Result

Notes

News.com.au

https://news.com.au
https://www.news.com.au

Failed
Failed

https://news.com.au raises an SSL
error with no certificate matching
hostname ‘news.com.au’, while
https://www.news.com.au redirects
to http://www.news.com.au

Nine News

https://nine.com.au
https://www.nine.com.au

Passed
Passed

https://nine.com.au redirects to
https://www.nine.com.au

Failed
Failed

https://abc.net.au/news is refusing
connection altogether, while
https://www.abc.net.au/news raises
an SSL error with no certificate
matching hostname
‘www.abc.net.au’

ABC News

https://abc.net.au/news
https://www.abc.net.au/news

Daily Mail
Australia

https://dailymail.co.uk/auhome
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/auhome

Failed
Failed

https://dailymail.co.uk/auhome
raises an SSL error with no
certificate matching hostname
‘dailymail.co.uk’, while
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/auho
me also raises an SSL error with no
certificate matching hostname
‘www.dailymail.co.uk’

Yahoo7 News

https://au.news.yahoo.com

Passed

This works without any issues.

Bureau of
Meteorology

https://bom.gov.au
https://www.bom.gov.au

Failed
Failed

https://bom.gov.au is refusing
connection altogether, while
https://www.bom.gov.au shows a
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blank page titled ‘Service
Unavailable’

Weatherzone

https://weatherzone.com.au
https://www.weatherzone.com.au

Failed
Failed

https://weatherzone.com.au raises
an SSL error with no certificate
matching hostname
‘weatherzone.com.au’, while
https://www.weatherzone.com.au
redirects to
http://www.weatherzone.com.au

AccuWeather

https://www.accuweather.com/en/au/
australia-weather

Passed

This works without any issues.

Interestingly, this test has exposed a number of popular news and weather websites that do not support HTTPS.
First of all, a number of these domain names do not have SSL certificate set up (news.com.au, www.abc.net.au,
dailymail.co.uk, www.dailymail.co.uk, and weatherzone.com.au). Secondly, some are redirecting to their HTTP
counterpart (https://www.news.com.au and https://www.weatherzone.com.au). The rest are refusing connection
(https://abc.net.au/news and https://bom.gov.au) or denying the service (https://www.bom.gov.au).
One explanation for why a number of these websites are reluctant to support HTTPS is that their resources (such
as graphic, JavaScript and CSS files) are delivered by some third-party CDN (Content Delivery Network) over
HTTP for performance reasons. If a webpage is delivered over HTTPS but its resources are delivered over HTTP
– also known as mixed content – it will get blocked by web browsers (van Bergen, 2018). Additionally, many of
these websites are also heavily advertisement sponsored. Most advertisement networks, as highlighted in the
gaming test, are delivering their contents over HTTP, also for performance reasons. For these reasons, operators
of these websites have little to no incentives to move on to HTTPS.
Regarding the two government-funded websites, ABC News and Bureau of Meteorology, where the advertisement
is not a deciding factor, it is disappointing to learn of their lack of HTTPS support. One can only assume that it is
due to lack of funding for upgrades that are not justifiable.
Navigation
In this test, navigation apps were put to the test. Results are documented in Table 10.
Table 10: Results of Using Navigation Apps
App

Result

Notes

Google Maps

Passed

App works flawlessly.

Waze

Passed

App works flawlessly.

No issues were encountered while using these apps. Locations are obtained from GPS, so this aspect will not be
impacted by the filtering solution. The apps do require to communicate with their backend servers and no issues
were found, this confirms that they are communicating over HTTPS.
Banking
Some banking apps were put to the test next. Results are tabulated in Table 11 below.
Table 11: Results of Using Banking Apps
App

Result

Notes

Westpac

Passed

App works flawlessly.

Bankwest

Passed

App works flawlessly.

ING

Passed

App works flawlessly.

The test has confirmed that all these banking apps are communicating with their backend over HTTPS, as they all
work flawlessly in every aspect. This is something that is expected of financial institutions when dealing with
sensitive data.
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Taking Pictures
This test investigates whether user experience of taking pictures is affected in any way. Two apps were used in
this test, their results are documented in Table 12 below.
Table 12: Results of Using Navigation Apps
App

Result

Notes

Camera app

Passed

Works flawlessly.

Google Photos

Passed

Works flawlessly. Photos were synchronised to and from the cloud
seamlessly. Notifications work as normal.

As expected, the test shows that the Camera app is not affected in any way, since it works independently of network
connectivity. Google Photos has also shown to work well, photos taken on the phone were uploaded to the cloud
as usual.
Using Other Common Apps
In this test, some other apps are being investigated, the results are tabulated in Table 13 below.
Table 13: Results of Using Common Apps
App

Result

Notes

Google Play Store

Passed

Works flawlessly, including downloading and installing apps.

Ebay

Passed

Works flawlessly. Notifications work as normal.

Gumtree

Passed

Works flawlessly. Notifications work as normal.

Failed

On the main screens, only textual contents are showing, all graphics
contents are not displaying. Furthermore, when an article is clicked,
the page displays an error saying “Webpage not available” due to
the app trying to load an HTTP content.

ABC

CONCLUSION
Mobile devices are constantly making connections with remote services, many of which are insecure with cleartext
contents visible to third-parties while in transit. As a result, sensitive information is being exposed, and the device
is made vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. If all insecure outbound traffic can be blocked on the device,
then such attacks can be mitigated.
This research has proved that a non-rooted and on-device filtering solution is feasible on an Android device,
without the need of an external VPN service. It was achieved by using the VpnService class provided by the
Android SDK. Outbound packets are routed to the filtering app through the virtual network interface, giving the
app the ability to block HTTP packets only.
Such filtering solution, as shown in the speed tests, is very performant with little impact on the network speed,
while day-to-day mobile usage tests have revealed a number of interesting things. First of all, there is no noticeable
drain on power consumption, even though Android might incorrectly attribute power and network usage of other
apps to NetGuard (“NetGuard Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)”, 2018).
Secondly, app usage is mostly unaffected. Apps that rely on HTTP were quickly exposed, with contents missing
and failing to load, such as ABC iview, SBS on Demand, and ABC apps. All gaming apps tested were affected
but only in the delivery of advertisement contents, not in the game plays.
The area which is impacted the most is the browsing experience. This is due to a number of websites still failing
to support HTTPS, despite Google’s plan of shaming and downgrading ranking on HTTP-only websites.

FUTURE WORK
As discussed earlier, the implementation of the filtering solution taken in this research blocks TCP packets destined
for remote host’s port 80 only, HTTP connections to other ports will not be blocked. Additionally, all other network
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protocols, such as UDP, as well as all other cleartext TCP protocols not destined for port 80, will also not be
blocked. One recommendation for further research is to make required modifications in NetGuard such that it
examines content in the transport or application layer, rather than just in the network layer, to determine whether
the traffic should be blocked.
Another area for further research is to extend this work to iOS. iOS NetworkExtension SDK provides a class called
NEPacketTunnelProvider (“NEPacketTunnelProvider – Create a principal class for a Packet Tunnel Provider app
extension”, n.d.) which can be used for this purpose.
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